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In the Supreme Court

of the State of Utah
BUEHNER BLOCK COMPANY, a
corp., and SOUTH STATE BUILDERS SUPPLY COMPANY, a corp.,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
-vs.NICK GLEZOS, HARRY HONG,
CHARLES C. McDERMOND, COPA
SUPPER CLUB, a corp., and
VALLEY AMUSEMENT ENTERPRISES, INCORPORATED, a corp.,
Defendants and Appellant.

Case No. 8591

BRIEF OF DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT
HARRY HONG

PARTIES OF INTEREST
1. Buehner Block Company, a corporation, respondent and plaintiff. Furnished building blocks and materials
of a value of $695.51 for property located at 3793 South
State Street, Salt Lake City, Utah, generally known as,
and hereafter referred to as the "Golden Pheasant" or
the "Copa Supper Club."
2. South State Builders Supply Company, a corporation, respondent and plaintiff. Furnished building materials of a value of $395.84 for said property.
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3. Nick Glezos, named defendant. Ovv-rner in fee of
said property ·upon which building material was used
(R. 46).
4. Harry Hong, appellant and named defendant.
A Chinaman and leaseholder of said property owned by
Nick Glezos (R. 46, 47, 49, Lease Agreement Exhibit 5).
5. C. C. McDermond, named defendant, ajkja
Charles L. McDermond, and Chase ~IcDermond. Subtenant of Harry Hong (R. 47, 63, 64, 65, 69), building contractor who ordered and received material from plaintiff
and respondent, Buehner Block Co. (R. 47, Notice of
Lien, Exhibit 2; R. 48, Order and Delivery Slips, Exhibit 1), a charter member of named defendant Copa
Supper Club; president and director of named defendant
Valley Amusen1ent Enterprises Incorporated (R. 8);
prospective purchaser of lease and fixtures from Harry
Hong (R. 50, 56, 59, 60, 66, 68, 71). Judgment entered
against by default (R. 14).
6. "Copa Supper Club," a corporation, named defendant. Formed and incorporated as a non profit corporation on the 22nd day of January, 195±, at Salt Lake
City, lTtah. Incorporators thereof being Joseph
L. Sloan, Charles L. ill cDet·'lno n d, Morris Hayden~ Eileen
Hayden, Lee T. Louie*, Ray Nebeker, :Jirs. Bo}Td Douglas, Wesley Cro,vther, 11ar ry Lee*, To nz I'" ee:~, and
J iJn'Jnic Flong*. The directors thereof "·ere as follows:
Ray Nebeker, 1\frs. Boyd Douglas, '': esley Crowther,
Ha1'TY Lee*, Tont Yee*. Judgn1ent entered against ~•copa
Supper Club" by default (R. 14).
7. Valley A1nusement Enterprises Incorporated, a
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corporation, named defendant. Formed and incorporated
for pecuniary profit on the 18th day of November, 1954,
at Salt Lake C~ity, Utah, and capitalized for $10,000.00 at
$1.00 per share. Incorporators and officers being:
Name

Shares

Officer

Chase llf cDermond --------------------------------··---3 ,100 President
H. T. Cope __________________________________________________ 2,500 V.-Pres.
Spence Van N oy (see 8 below) ______________ 1 ,950

T~reasurer

Ray E. Nebeker------------------------------------------ 500 Director
R. Worthen Gibbs ____________________________________1,950 Secretary
Article 22 of the Articles of Incorporation of the Valley
Amusement Enterprises Incorporated reads as follows:
"The amount of the capital stock of this Corpor.ation consists of a lease dated the 1st day of
December, 1953, covering the property located at
3793 South State Street, Salt Lake City, Utah,
generally known as the "Golden Pheasant," with
the appurtenances and privileges thereunto belonging which the Corporation shall hereby and
does purchase, take, receive .and hold and $6,900.00
paid into said Corporation.
"The fair estimated cash value of said lease
is $3,100.00 and the said leasehold is taken, held,
and received and purchased by the s.aid Corporation in full payment of and for the capital stock
of 3,100 shares; and the respective owner of said
·*Lee T. Louie, Harry Lee, Tom Yee and Jimmie Fong are Chinamen. Two of these four Chinamen, Harry Lee and ·Tom Yee,
are directors.
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leasehold above described has agreed with the Incorporators and the corporation that upon and
simultaneously with the issue of the chart~r herein that the said number of shares fully paid shall
be delivered to the said holder and the said holder
is to convey the lease upon the descr~bed property
to the Corporation and that the Issue of such
stock and the transfer of such leasehold shall constitute full payment respectively."

Judgment entered against by default (R. 14).
8. Spencer VanNoy, not a defendant. Known also
as Spence 'Tan N oy (see 7 above)~ building and general
contractor who ordered, received and paid for materials
from plaintiff and respondent, South State Builders
Supply (R. 53, R. 48, Notice of Lien,- Exhibit 4; Order
and Delivery Slips, Exhibit 3; R. 36 (3) Answer to Interrogatory No. 1, f, h, and i, admitting payments received
from and credit given to Spencer VanNoy for materials
supplied for and on behalf of "Copa Supper Club"), also
incorporator, treasurer and director of named defendant,
Valley Amusen1ent Enterprises Incorporated.

''T

9. Willian1 0.
atson, not a party to this action,
but a witness for the plaintiffs and respondents. Contracted to do the blocl\. 'vork for approxin1atel~T five
to six hundred dollars (R. 80). TF.itness, after a long
1.ohile and much difficulty, got paid for u~ork, but one
young fellow that u;as working for this 1citness, to this
day has in the neighborhood of $150.00 coming that he
didn't get because this 1citness felt Harry Jlong quit
paying the labor b·ills (R. 81, 89). Hired by and contract
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of employment and agreement was with l\!lcDermond
(R. 83, 84).
10. Donald L. Buehner, credit and office manager
for plaintiff and respondent, Buehner Block Co. First
talked to appellant and defendant Harry Hong during
the construction of the back part (R. 84); admitted block
was first ordered cjo the Golden Pheasant, that they
inve.stigated the order and found that owner Glezos
knew nothing of order so went to premises and talked
to McDennond and was told that McDermond ordered the
block and so changed the order so that contract was with
McDermond and not cjo the "Golden Pheasant'' (R. 85,
see also every order and delivery slip and specifically
order and delivery slip #28297 dated 7/14/54 charged to
and signed by C. C. McDermond cjo Golden Pheasant,
and the following slips #28326 and #28327 dated 7/15/54,
plus subsequent delivery slips, charged to C. C. McDermond, with no mention of c/o the Golden Pheasant thereon.) Aforesaid order and delivery .slips are found between R. 39 and 40, and are referred to because it is
noted that Exhibit 1 does not include one order and
delivery slip, the first one #28297, dated 7/14/54, which
makes mention of c;'o "Golden Pheasant" and which supports and bears out the witness' story and verifies the
fact to be that plaintiff Buehner Block Co. had notice
within 24 hours that they were dealing with McDermond
on delivering the block, and did not rely at all upon the
"Golden Pheasant," appellant Hong, or anyone else in
supplying the block.
11. Wayne R. Kinzer, not a party to this action.
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Witness for plaintiffs, who did brickwork on premise.s
and was paid therefor by witness William 0. Watson.
Did some added work on the pre1nises that he hadn't been
paid for at the time of trial (R. 91).
STATE~IENT O:B, THE CASE

Defendant and appellant Harry Hong, hereafter referred to as appellant Hong, a Chinaman, was leasing
from Nick Glezos the premises located at 3793 South
State Street, Salt Lake City, Utah, a restaurant and
cafe generally known as the "Golden Pheasant," under a
leased dated the 1st day of December, 1953, and marked
as Exhibit 5 (R. 49, 61) and previously referred to in
Article 22 of the Articles of Incorporation of the \Talley
Amusement Enterprise Incorporated. This lease provided for payment of $250.00 per month rent, and provided that appellant Hong would not allow said premises
to be used for any purpose that would incre3.;Se the rate of
insurance thereon, and paragraph 6 provided that appellant Hong would not assign the lease or sublet the said
premises, or any part thereof, ,,-ithout the written consent of named defendant Nick Glezos, l1ereafter referred
to as owner Glezos. Prior to Deee1nber 1~ 1953, appellant
Hong had bought the fixtures and business at a oost
of $8,000.00 and installed other equipn1ent and remodeled so that the 'vhole thing cost around $36,000.00
(R. 56). Prior to May or June of 1954, nan1ed defendant
C. C. McDermond, hereafter referred to as promoter McDermond, approached appellant Hong and wanted to buy
him out, but wanted .a larger place. Appellant Hong at
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this time introduced promoter McDermond to owner
Glezos as the man who wanted to buy appellant Hong out
(R. 70). Promoter McDermond .after talking with owner
Glezos got permission from Glezos to build on the premises if he bought appellant Hong out and paid for everything (R. 71). On the 14th day of July, 1954, promoter
McDermond ordered and continued to order to the 6th
day of August, 1954, all material from plaintiff and respondent, Buehner Block Co. and Buehner Block Co. only
(see first order and delivery slip #28297, found between
R. 39 .and 40, also Exhibits 1 and 2). Promoter McDermond ordered nothing from plaintiff respondent
South State Builders Supply.
About September 18, 1954, appellant Hong became
sick .and closed the place (R. 55, 63), and at this time
promoter McDermond was going to buy the place (R. 65).
Appellant Hong reopened the cafe about April of 1955
(R. 55, 59). During this time, promoter McDermond, or
Dr. Richard Gibbs of the Copa Supper Club, paid appellant Hong $250.00 a month rent (R. 63).
Thereafter, beginning on the 23rd day of October,
1954, the treasurer and director of the v. . alley Amusement
Enterprise·s, Inc., also building contractor for the "Cop.a
Supper Club," Spencer Van N oy, hereafter referred to
as Copa Supper Club \Tan N oy, ~s a general contractor
(Notice of Lien, Exhibit 4) and on behalf of the named
defendant Copa Supper Club (see every order and delivery slips between R. 39 and 40, also Exhibit 3), did
order and continue to order all material front plaintiff
and respondent, South State Builders Supply from the
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23rd day of October to the 5th day of November, 1954
(Ex. 3 and 4).
On the 18th day of November, 1954, the Valley
Amusement Enterprises, Inc., was incorporated with
promoter McDermond as president and Copa Supper
Club Van Noy as treasurer, with the declaration in
Article 22 thereof to the effect that promoter McDermond, and McDermond solely, and not representing a
partnership or anyone else, agreed to convey the lease
to the premises to the said corporation, receiving all stock
issued therefor to himself. (Note is made of the fact that
promoter McDermond rece·ived 3,100 shares at par value
of $3,100.00, and the declaration in Article 22 that the
fair estimated cash value of said lease was $3,100.00.)
On the 29th day of December, 1954, plaintiff Buehner
Block Company did record materialmans lien for furnishing n1aterials to C. C. l\fcDermond, who was the building
contractor for owner Glezos, against owner Glezos only
(Exhibit 2).
On the 31st day of Decen1ber, 195-!, plaintiff South
State Builders Supply did record materialmans lien for
furnishing 1naterials to Spencer \Tan Noy, who was the
building contractor for owner Glezos (Exhibit 4), who
ordered said Inaterial for and in behalf of the c·opa Supper Club. Said lien was docketted against owner Glezos
only (Exhibit 3).
On the 29th day of January, 1955, the Copa Supper
Club w.as incorporated ~s a non profit corporation with
promoter McDermond as a charter n1ember, along with
four Chinamen, Lee T. Lottie, Harry Lee, Torn Yee and
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Jimmie Fang. Said !larry Lee and Tom l'"'"ee being directors of said Copa Supper Club. (Nate is rnade that
treasurer Van N oy was not a charter 1nember but was a
contractor for said Copa Supper Club and ordered all
materials furnished by plaintiff South State Builders
Supply Company as ev·idenced by Exhibits 3 and 4).
On the 13th day of June, 1955, plaintiff Buehner
Block Co. did file a complaint -consisting of two cause.s of
action against all named defendants (R. 1, 2, 3). Plaintiff
South State Builders Supply, on the 3rd day of November, 1955, did file a similar complaint (R. 17, 18, 19).
The allegations were alike, and as a result thereof party
plaintiffs were joined (R. 20).
The type of action involved here is best described by
quoting the plaintiffs trial description thereof, as follows:
"Now our action here has been commenced
upon two theories. One, that we claim a lien upon
the property for the material fut·nished and upon
the leasehold interest because of the lessee, Mr.
Hong, dealing and working with Mr. McDermond
and the materialmen in procuring materials for
the building there.
TFIE COURT:

Is McDermond the con-

tractor~

MR. CONDER: (Attorney for plaintiffs)
McDern~ond is the subtenant with Mr. Hong, as I
understand it, although I've never seen any contract between the1n. McDermond is the one who
ordered the material, I must admit that. So far
as the direct contract is concerned we have no direct contract with-1lfr. Hong, nor with Mr. Glezos.
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We clairn an in~plied contract because of the be??'efit to them, the knowledge they had an~ the illl-

plied consent and ll:nprovemen~s wh1c~ were
placed on the property, the un.1ust enr-t?hment
which they received to the property as be~ng the
basic ca·use of action." (R. 47)
In order to pass upon the errors which appellant
claims were committed, it is deemed necessary to direct
the attention of this court to the plaintiffs pleadings and
the evidence offered and received at the trial, together
with findings, and conclusions arrived therefrom.
In plaintiffs first cause of action (the foreclosure of
lien count), the only allegation contained in the entire
cause of action is allegation 7, (Buehner R. 2, South State
R. 18).
Plaintiffs second cause of action (the unjust enrichment count) the only allegations in the entire cause of
action are 2 and 3, 'vhich are identical in both plaintiffs
complaint, except as to amount and are as follows:
2. "All of the defendants herein clairn some
interest in the property described in Paragraph
4 of plaintiff's first cause of action, either by way
of ownership or lease hold estate_ and the exact
nature of the interest of each defendant is unknown to this plaintiff.
3. The plaintiff herein furnished building
materials for· the benefit of defendants, or each of
them, and plaintiff should be reimbursed for the
reasonable value of the Inaterial so furnished
which plaintiffs allege to be $695.51 and $395.84.';
(R. 2, 3, 18)
Appellant Hong filed a n1otion to dis1niss because
plaintiffs complaint failed to state a clann against appellant upon which relief could be granted (R. 6). This mo-
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tion was denied and appellant Hong subsequently answered the plaintiffs complaints by a general denial (R.
15, 16, 22, 23).
Default judgments were taken against named defendants Charles C. McDermond, Copa Supper Club and
V.alley Amusement Enterprises, Inc., with no findings
of fact or conclusions of law being filed in support thereof (R. 13, 14).
Written interrogatories were submitted to plaintiffs
by owner Glezos and in answer thereto plaintiff Buehner
Block Company answered that no payments were made
by anyone on the material supplied (R. 38), and that the
following named were every person whom they proposed
to offe!r or call as a witness: Don Buehner, William Watson, and others not called on to testify (R. 40). (Witness
Kinzer was not named or disclosed.)
To the same interrogatories, South State Builders
Supply answered that Spencer \Tan Noy (Copa Supper
Club VanNoy) did make two pay"Tilents for rnaterial.s supplied, and received credit for sandpaper returned
(R. 36), and that following named were every person
whom they proposed t<;> offer or call as a witnes.s : Nick
Glezos, Spencer Van N oy, and others not called on to
testify (R. 37). (Witness I{inzer was not named or disclosed.)
The first witness called by the plaintiffs was ,appellant Hong, who ~s an adverse witness testified as follows:
That he leased from owner Glezos as per lease received
in evidence and marked Exhibit 5 (R. 49). He was asked
if '•Subsequently they built the room in back. Do you
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remember that~" He answered "Yes." (R. 49) He was
asked "When did they commence that building in the
back, do you know f' He answered he didn't know exactly.
He testified that promoter ~IcDermond wanted to buy his
place but wanted a bigger place. He told promoter McDermond that he could not allow anyone to build on the
premises without the landlord's consent. That a week or
two later at promoter lvicDermond's insistence, he did
introduce him to owner Glezos. At the introduction, he
stayed a few minutes and then never returned. That
at the time he heard owner Glezos ask promoter ~Ic
Dermond if the room wasn't big enough for him, to which
promoter McDermond replied that he wanted a private
club for the purpose of putting a floor show and everything in the same, and that he, promoter McDermond,
was going to pay for everything. That upon McDermond
promising to pay for everything, owner Glezos said it
was all right for him to go ahead and build on the premises (R. 50).
After this testilnony he " . as asked ~'After that did
they start to work on the back there f' He answered
"Yes." (R. 51) That until approximately September
of 1955, he was paying $250.00 a 1uonth rent, but at the
thne of trial 'vas paying only $125.00 per n1onth rent and
was utilizing about half the space (R. 51). That he did
not give promoter l\IcDern1ond permission to tear the
place up, and told him not to do so until he paid for ""hat
he had put in (R. 52). He adn~itted that he knew Mr.
V ~n N ~y b1,~;t denied ~hat h..e had evet" had any agreement
w~th h~~m about putt~ng the building up and that he had
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no agreement with anybody concerning putting the building up. That he ordered none of the materials that went
into the building and saw none of the materials delivered
to the job ( R. 53). He denied telling anyone to build or
to change any part of the building. That he knew nothing
about what the Copa Supper Club d!d or whether or not
it was a corporation. That he knew nothing about the
Valley Amuse1nent Enterpri.ses or anything about the
clubs (R. 54).
Then to direct questions asked, he answered that he
never owned any stock in, or was never a 1ne1nber of the
Copa Supper Club or the Valley Amusernent Enterprises,
Inc. In .answer to the following question, "Were you there
when they were building the room," he answered "Yes."
That he was there part of the time, but becan1e sick on or
about the 18th day of September, 1954, and that thereafter he had closed his cafe. That promoter McDermond
and those fellows were going to buy his place, the back
part of the roo1n. The Copa Supper Club or Valley
Amusement Enterprises, Inc., didn't pay .so they gave
me back the front part and he opened the san1e in April
of 1955 (R. 55). That they had agreed to p~ay him what
he had put into the premises, including his initial cost
of buying the place, his fixtures and improve1nents since
first occupation (R. 56). He denied ever introducing promoter l\fcDermond to owner Glezos as his partner. That
he didn't know Mr. Watson. He denied having eve-r paid
out any checks whatsoever to anyone on the work, for
either material or labor. That he did not know and had
never seen a Harry Lee (R. 58). That he did not know a
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Tom Yee but did know a Jimmie Fong. That Jimmie
Fong did ' work for him a couple of months when he reopened his cafe in April of 1955, but he didn't know
whether or not Jimmie Fong had anything to do with the
back part of the building and that he had no connection
with him in the event he did so. He specifically denied
having ever told owner Glezos that he was going to take
promoter McDermond a.s a partner with him in his business. That promoter ~IcDermond tried to get in but that
he told hi1n that he to had to have some money to buy the
share before he got in, and that he never received any
money so couldn't put him in. That he never gave promoter McDermond permission to build on the back.
On cross examination, appellant Hong testified that
he never saw anyone deliver any of the material, had
never been sent a statement or invoice by either one of
the plaintiffs, and never signed for any of the materials.
That he had an agreen1ent to lease the premises to promoter l\lcDer1nond and also to selling hlln fixtures. That
the reason said agree1nent did not go through was because promoter l\IcDern1ond ne¥er paid him anything
( R. 60). That he didn ,t recall after the building was built,
anyone fron1 South State Builders Supply or Buehner
Block coming and discussing any kind of payment for
the building with hin1 or asking hi1n ''ho was going to
pay for it (R. 61, see also testinzony of u:itness Buehner
R. 85 verifying that appellant nzight not have recog-nized
plaintiIf Buehner as a creditor).
Upon further cross exa1nination, he testified that he
didn't know at first "'"ho ran the back part because he
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was sick at that time, September of 1954. That he received $250.00 rent for the back part from promoter McDermond and upon receiving the $250.00 per month rent
from promoter McDermond or Dr. Richard Gibbs, he
paid the same over to owner Glezo.s (R. 63). Th.at he
continued to receive payment in the amount of $250.00
from the people in the back until August of 1955 (R. 64).
Upon recross examination, he testified that pending
promoter McDermond keeping his promise to take the
whole thing, he leased the premises for the amount of
rent he was obligated to pay himself. That promoter
McDermond paid him nothing in advance for this lease,
and that he paid him by personal check, except for
some being signed by Dr. Gibbs or a Mary Gibbs. That
he didn't remember for sure having received a check
from the Copa Supper Club and that he did have an
agreement with promoter McDermond to purchase the
fixtures and take the lease over. That he never advised
promoter McDermond to go ahead and build a building
on the premises (R. 69).
Next witness called was Mr. Nick Glezos, one of
the defendant, called as an adverse witness for the plaintiff. He testified that he was the owner of said premises.
He was asked "Do you recall that H.arry Hong came
to you and told you they wanted to build a back roon1
on there~'' He answered "Yes." That it wa.s sometime in
May or June that Harry Hong told him that he had
a man that seemed to have a lot of money that wanted
to build a big place for his own benefit. That Harry s.aid
that he wasn't making any money there and that he might
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have a chance to sell it. That he could not build a bigger
place but he wanted to see ''that man." That subsequently,
Harry Hong brought him out one- Sunday afte-rnoon and
introduced promoter McDerrnond to him (R. 70). He
was asked the question "Did he introduce Mr. McDermond to you as his partner?" (R. 70). Answer "No, he
is the man he like.s to buy the place if you will fix it
just the way he wanted it." (R. 71) That he gave pron1oter McDermond permission to build on the place if
he was going to buy Harry Hong out, and upon the condition that promoter McDermond would pay for everything. Promoter McDermond told lrim that he would
and that he had lots of money. He recalled having given
a deposition on the lOth day of April, 1956, and that
in answer to "Now, will you tell me what was said by
you and Harry Hong~'' he answered, "\\Tell, he just
asked if it would be all right to build another room there
because his business not so good. He had a partner to
come in with him.~' In answer to this~ O'IL'ner Glezos
testified under oath at the trial~ ,.Well. I nz i.sund erstood
you. You know what I 1nean. He says he was going to
go in and buy the place. You know Harry's place, and
the place he 'Yanted "~asn't big enough for his crowd he
was going to bring in there and I just objected, you
know. Finally, you know, he says, 'Nick, you don't have
to spend nothing,' he says." Again referring to the deposition taken on the lOth day of April, 1956, the question
was asked, "McDern1ond and Harry Hong together~"
answer ''Yes. l\fcDern1ond was supposed to put up the
money." Question unid I 1tnderstand you to say that h.e
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was partners with McDermond?" Answer "No. He was
going to take him in as a partner." Then it was asked,
"That was your answer at that time~" Answer "Well,
maybe he was. Maybe I didn't understand it quite enough.
You know what I mean. I seen them together there and
Harry had the lease on it and I can do nothing else, you
know what I mean." Question "But those were the questions and answers you gave at your deposition~" Answer
"Yes, I think so." (R. 72) That after the building was
put up, he received the sum of $125.00 from appellant
Hong as rent and received from one Mr. Kopps the
sum of $250.00 as rent for the rear portion of the building. He testified that they tore down one of the rear
walls without his permission, and he didn't know they
were going to make an entrance through the back room.
That they told him they weren't going to do it, but they
did tear down twenty-five feet and they made one roo1n
out of it and they made Mr. Hong's place small so he
couldn't use it for a restaurant. That is why he close up.
He denied telling the1n that they could go .ahead and
build a room back there, and told them he was going
to sue them but they did it anyway. That up to November,
1955, Harry Hong paid $250.00 a month rent, but since
had paid the amount of $125.00. That since said month
of November, 1955, he received the sum of $250.00 as
rental for the back portion. That he told them, whoever
it was, Dr. Gibbs, that they would have to pay him the
tax difference and the insurance rate, and he said "I
will." (R. 74). The rear room added on is presently
leased to a Mr. Kopps, who says that he bought the place
from a Dr. Gibbs.
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Up·on cross examination, owner Glezos testified that
the-re have been a lot of changes in the operators of
the back portion (R. 76). That when it was originally
rented to Mr. Hong it had a private room for private
parties, and that this had been destroyed by the building
onto the premises.
In redirect examination, the question was asked,
"I would like to know from either Mr. Hong or 1Ir.
Glezos if either of them obtained a building permit
for this part." Mr. Glezos answered that he had not,
and Mr. I-Iong answered that he had not (R. 78). Owner
Glezos admitted that he was presently getting $375.00
now as rent for the said premises when he was getting
$250.00 before. The question was asked, "Did you know
from Mr. McDermond what kind of a room he was going
to build back there before he started!" And to this
Owner Glezos answered "No. Ko, I didn't." (R. 78)
Plaintiffs then called William 0. Watson, who testified under oath that he did the brick masonry work
during the sun1n1er of 1954, on said premises. That he
had h.ad conversation "~ith the defendant Hong probably
half a dozen different times. That he could not testify
to one person \vho Yras present 'vhen he had an~~ of these
conversations inasmuch as each and ey·ery conversation
was with him alone. He testified that Harry Hong and
one other of his cottntrynzen upto''~ had an agreement
with McDermond and three other partners. That Harry
Hong and, he believed Harry Lee, agreed tJ1at the other
four partners were to pay .all the labor that ,Yent into
the building, and in return the other four partners were
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supposed to have paid material bills on the construction
(R. 80).
At this time, it should be noted that one Harry Lee
and Tom Y ee were named directors in the Copa Supper
Club, and that appellant Hong was not even a member.
Also that the court admonished the witness to tell just
what Harry Hong said in conversations to him, not
what he understood, for the reason that the court would
make the understanding from wh.at was told to him, and
to what he said Harry Hong said to him (R. 80). N-otwithstanding and disregarding this admonition, the witness went on to immediately testify "and after about two
or three weeks, Harry Hong and his partner evidently
backed out of the de;al and it threw McDermond. McDermond told me that it threw everything up in the air
because these two fellows had backed out and they
couldn't go ahead and make their payments on the building as a result. After a long while I got my money, but
I had one young fellow that was working for me .at the
time "\vhen I got through with the block work McDermond
wanted to borrow him for a couple of weeks to help
the carpenters and various other things ; pouring the
cement, and to this day he has still got in the neighborhood of $150.00 coming that he didn't get because Harry
Hong and his partner quit paying the lab-or bills .and on
top of that Harry Hong had told me the:re was six of
them originally agreed to go in on that deal." (R. 81).
On cro.ss examination the court .asked the question
"Well, I understand he got paid but Buehner Block and
South State didn't. Do I understand, Mr. Watson you
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to say that 1\tir. Hong told you that he and Lee w~re
going to pay for the labor, but the other four were going
to pay for the building materials~'' Answer "That's
correct." Question by the court, "And that all six of
them were partners~" Answer "Yes." "\Vitness was then
asked when, where he was when Mr. Hong told him this
and he said, "Oh! on the southwest corner of the building,
outside." To the question of what time of day it was, he
could only venture to say that it was around sometime
in the morning between nine and twelve o'clock, and that
he could not make it any more definite than that (R. 82).
He admitted appellant Hong hadn't hired or retained him
and that McDermond had hired him for the work. He
said that he was told by Mr. McDermDnd that he had built
at least ten different night clubs throughout the Rocky
Mountain Area and that the six of thent were extending
the b·uilding back there ·with the consent of Harry Hong.
Then he apparently caught himself and added, "who was
also one of the six," and that Harry Hong was going to
handle the restaurant part of it and :ilieDermond and
his partners were going to handle the back part. But
to his knowledge "It u·aB all supposed to be under the
one corporation of these six different people, which
Harry Hong was one of them." He "~as then asked "Did
he tell you it was a corporation~" He ans,,ered "He told
me there was six partners, that he U'as on-e of themHarry Hong was one of them, and I believe there was
a Mr. Lee uptown that was a Chinese - that has a
Chinese restaurant, and th-ere 'vas two or three other
partne·rs." He was asked if there was ever anything
said about a corporation in his conversations, and he
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answered "They said it would be a company. I wouldn't
know whether you would say it was a corporation or a
company. It's just partners. lVIcDermond told me there
was six partners there and Harry Hong was one of
them." (R. 83)
The next witness called by the plaintiff was
Donald L. Buehner, who testified that he was
the credit manager of said company during the year
1954 and during the construction of the addition to the
Golden Pheasant. He testified that his first conver13ation
with Mr. Hong was during the construction of the
back part. He was asked to tell what was said, if
anything, regarding the .account. lie an.swered "I was
cu'rious to know who was going to accept the liability
for this. l\1r. 1\fcDermond had sent me to Harry
Hong and I approached him and told him who I represented and that we were wondering who was going to
pay for this merchandise. He said that he was going
to get the money from McDermond, and indicated if that
happened he would pay for it." (R. 85) H·e was then
asked if he had any subsequent conversation with Harry
Hong. He answered "Yes. I approached him. I don't
know exactly how many times - four or five times in
that front part of his restaurant.." He was asked whether
or not all of the conversations were relative to the collection of this .account, and he answered "Yes . . . I
tried to get an answer from him. He kind of would not
commit himse.lf. I used the logic that there was a possibility of him being liable for it and if he knew that
because he had a lease, trying to get an answer fro,Jn
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him, and he recognized me and knew I was from Buehner
Block towards the end of our visits." This last is accented
for the purpose of accenting the fact that plaintiff never
relied on the leasehold or Hong and th·at the defendant
Hong is not overly observant or overburdened with the
ability of knowing all that goes on about him (R. 85).
Upon cross examination, ~Ir. Buehner was asked the
question ''Had Mr. McDermond ordered the block from
you or your company~" He answered "Yes. Well, someone
called and ordered for the Golden Pheasant. We investigated because Mrs. Glezos didn't know anything about it.
We looked up the owner of the Golden Pheasant and so
went over there and ~Ir. ~IcDermond was there and said
that it was he that ordered in this Golden Pheasant name
and we changed it." At this point it should be noted that
the first order placed for supplies was on the 14th day of
July, 1954, as per order slip #28:297, and the same was
charged to C. C. McDermond c/o Golden Pheasant. The
next order was placed the following day as per orderslip No. 28326, dated the 15th day of July~ 1954, and
on that and others thereafter the deliveries were charged
to C. C. McDermond alone and c/o Copa Supper Club and
mention is not made again of cjo Golden Pl1easant (order
and delivery slips bet,veen R. 39 and -±0). The next question asked him was "In other words._ your contract was
with McDermond. Is that correct f" To which he answ·ered
"Yes.'' Thereafter he was asked if he intended to look for
payment to Mr. McDermond. He answered "No. When we
learne~d that out we had had experience "ith !Ir. McDer-

mond before and for that reason we were looking for
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liability." The next question was asked "So it was too
late. Mr. McDermond had the blocks and it was too
late." He answered then "No, not exactly." (R. 85) He
admitted that Harry Hong had never signed any invoice
or delivery slips and that he had never sent appellant
Hong a statement. In answer to the question "Did
Harry Hong ever agree to pay you for these blocks~''
he answered uunder the condition that 1V.lcDermond
would pay him." The court then asked the witness "Was
this after they were laid up or before~" The witness
answered "Well, I can't exactly remember. I think the
first conversation with Harry Hong was during the
construction of jt." The court then asked "And it is
during the time that they were being laid up that he
said he would pay you if McDermond paid him~" The
witness answered "Well, it was right close to that time."
(R. 86) Reference again is made to the fact that this
witness testified that when the order was first placed
it was placed and ordered in cjo Golden Pheasant n.ame,
and that thereafter they changed the order so that it
reflected the fact to be that the orders were made by
and in behalf of promoter McDermond and it is submitted by an examination of the delivery sheets that
this change was made within 24 hours.
Mr. Clyde then cross examined the witness and he
testified that he checked the city directory when the
order was first put in and thereafter called owner
G.lezos' wife and she didn't seem to know anything about
owner Glezos ordering the block so they went over to
the job. The question was asked "And the jobs had not
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yet been laid up on that first call, had they~" The witness answered "I don~t think they were." He was
then asked "You don't think they were~ Is that your
answer f' He answered "Yes."
At this point the plaintiffs rested, and Mr. Clyde
moV?ed the court for an order of dismissal with prejudice on the basis that one can't hold a mechanic's
lien against any landlord, and cited the case of Marrow.
vs. Merrit, 16 Utah 412, 52 Pac 667. The court then
asked the plaintiff's attorney, Conder, whether or not
they claimed a lien against owner Glezos, to which they
answered yes, they wished to foreclose against the lease
that Harry Hong had on the premises. The court then
said that it was the plaintiffs if they wanted it (this
before appellant had opportunity to put on defense),
to which Mr. Conder replied "\\'e may pursue that
remedy as long as it has been agreed here in court."
The court then made the statement "The difficulty is,
Mr. Conder, he didn't mislead thenz in any u·ay. He just
happened to be the owner." To "·hich :Jir. Conder replied
"His silence mislead then1." Mr. Cl~·de then states "You
haven't got testimony that ~~ou 'Yere dealing with the
owner." The court to this stated ""I don't think there
is any estoppel in any ·zcay again sf Jfr. Gl e.zos:~-· (R. 87)
It should be noted at this point that the court apparently
was of the belief that there "~as no estoppel against Mr.
Glezos, but that there was against appellant Hong, although there is not one word of testi1nony to support
such a belief. The court then made thi.s observation
"Now as to this other phase of it, Mr. Ashworth, this
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Mr. Watson lends sonte doubt about the matter as to
Mr. Hong." (R. 88) To this 1\fr. Ashworth replied that
Mr. Buehner relied upon 1fr. Hong for payment only
after the blocks had been delivered and they found out to
whon1 they had delivered them. That they were grasping
at straws to find out who was going to pay a.s long as Mr.
McDermond couldn't pay. That they made their contract
strictly with Mr. McDermond (R. 88). At this point, evidently witness Watson, who the respondents would like to
allege as being a disinterested person, felt so strongly
in the matter so ~s to bring attention to himself and to
t_he court, because the court interrupted counsel and
stated "Mr. Watson, do you want to say something~" To which Mr. Watson answered "Yes." Then
the court, upon it.s own motion and volition stated "Just
com-e in here." (R. 88) Upon this invitation by the court,
Mr. Watson, who supposedly is an unbiased and disinterested witness testified as follows: "At least five
different times McDermond promised and told me that
he would see Mr. Hong and Hong's associate uptown
to get me money for the work I had done. When I first
took the job he promised to pay me half of it before
I was even finished with the job .and the other half on
completion." The court then asked "That is McDermond ~" Mr. Watson, replied "Mr. McDermond. He said
he would see his partners uptown (R. 88), Mr. Hong
and the other Chinaman." At this point Mr. Ashworth
made an objection to the te.stimony as to what Mr. McDermond said. To this objection the court took no notice.
whatsoever. Mr. Watson then carried on without waiting
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for the court to pass on the objection of Mr. Ashworth,
and stated "And they would get the money. Then after
a week or two weeks after he got through with the
' stall because he said that Mr.
building, he gave me the
Hong and his associate uptown had refused to put any
more money up to handle the paying of the labor, which
they h~ad agreed to do. (It is noted that here witness
claimed Hong was to pay labor yet admitted that he
expected and was p.aid himself for labor by McDermond.
Also, it just doesn't make sense that Hong would put
into a partnership of six, his lease, expensive fixtures
and pay labor bills for improvements for nothing or
the privilege to .sh~are with five others in profits as a.
partner; or stock or club control in return). And that
threw McDermond into a jackpot because tu·o fellows
had backed down on their agreement, and as a result
there was one fellow that u·orked for me that has still
got $150.00 coming off of tlzat because jfr. Hong and
his partner ... " (R. 89)
At this point ~Ir. Ash"Torth again objected to the
testimony given by jlr. \"'\~ atson. The court again failed to
pass upon this obJection, and allo"Ted ~Ir. \\~atson to finish, "~1r. I-Iong and his partner refused to pa~T .any further payments." 1Jpon this staten1ent, the court said ·'All
right," with never a '\\rord concerning the objections made
by Mr. Ash,vorth, nor any apparent realization of the
fact that said witness "'".as anything but an unbiased and
unprejudiced witness, ina.smuch as he had difficulty being
paid and one fello'\\r '\\7ho worked for hin1 still had $150.00
coming fro1n the job. Thereafter, ~Ir. Conder argued that
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they didn't have to know that a partnership existed .at the
time materials were delivered and that when one learns
the existence of a principal he can hold the principal liable. To this ~fr. Ashworth replied "Of course there is no
partnership. Only on Mr. Watson's testimony." (R. 89)
The court then stated "Mr. Hong, as I understand him,
said there vvas no partnership. That he was going to
sell the property to ~1r. 11cDermond if and when he
got some money, and I sort of gatheTed from his testimony that pending these negotiations and pending the
getting of the money McDermond paid the rent. N o'v
that is the essence, is it not, of Mr. Hong's testimonyf'
(R. 89) Mr. Ashworth agre.ed that an agreement to sell
had been made up but there was not a copy to be submitted in evidence, to which the court replied "Well,
we ·don't have that here. But the thing that is quite
impressive is Mr. Watson's statement that Mr. Hong
said he was a partner." (R. 89) To this Mr. Ashworth
replied "The only thing Mr. Watson testified to is hearsay from Mr. 11cDermond," and that Mr. McDermond
couldn't bind Hong on a partnership basis by his statements, at least he didn't think so. The court thereupon
made the statement "But the thing that is troublesome
is this statement th.at Hong was supposed to have said.
'I am a partner with this man. He and I are· partners
with four others.' " To which Mr. Ashworth replied
"Of course I will agree that we have some conflicting
testimony." The court thereupon stated "In addition to
that, you have this other situation of Hong having a le.ase
on this property and consenting that they go in and do
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this remodeling which is somewhat of an unusual situation." (R. 90) (It might be noted that there is nothing
any more unusual about this situ·ation than the same
and similar situation that owner Glezo~ was in relation
to promoter l\IcDermond). At this point the court's
attention was again focused upon witness w·atson by his
apparent antics in open court at the backs of counsel for
the court at this point said uJust a 1ninute M'r. Watson.
We will call on you. They had to get Mr. Glezos' consent,
of course. I suppose under the lease that he couldn't tear
his building down without his consent. Well he consents to
that. They also had to get ~Ir. Hong's consent because he
had a lease on the property. Now he consents there and
they remodel his building. His business in effect they disputed. They take a ;.back i'Wall out of his building that
he had been using there. He must have had some interest
in it more than just a prospective seller with no money
down. If I were running a cafe and you came in and
wanted to buy 1ny cafe I wouldn't let you start tearing
it to pieces before you put some money in unless I had
son1e arrangements w·ith you, either as .a partner or
something in that nature." (R. 90) To this reasoning
it would be a safe bet what happened wouldn't have
happened if the trial judge had been the owner instead
of Glezos and the question Inight be asked, " . hy must
there be more interest in a party allo"i.ng such, than
'the interest of a prospective seller or co-tenant, especially in a case in which the prospective seller was not
making 1none·y and was in ill health? Mr. A.shworth
then stated "Of course l\fr. Hong testified ti1at he didn't
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give them the consent for remodeling the building or
to tear it down. He agreed to sell his part to them, his
fixtures in the cafe." The court thereupon said "Well,
the only trouble is he tells Mr. Watson he is a partner
there." Mr. Ashworth then replied "Of course that is
Mr. Watson'.s word agains~t that of Mr. Hong." The
court then took upon itself to state, and again act as counsel for plaintiff, "Come in, .~..o/1 r. Watson, if you want to
testify further." Mr. Watson then had this to say "The
fellow that has worked for me over a period of two
years just left and went and got the information I
think he can testify that Harry Hong .signed a check."
Mr. Ashworth at this point made an objection to him
testifying. The court thereupon, on its own motion and
volition stated "If he can testify you had better bring
him in. We can't have you testifying for. him." Mr.
Watson then testified "He got the check signed hy Harry
Hong." The court then asked "Is he here~" Mr. Draper
said, "Come forward," and the court said, "Let me see
that man .." Mr. Conder then stated "He was paid a check
by a Chinaman, Your Honor. He doesn't know whether
it was Mr. Hong or not." Mr. Kinze-r, who was the witness then stated, on his own behalf "Yes it was." Mr.
Conder then asked the court if they could reopen the
case, and the court s-aid they could.
At this point, it should be noted that Mr. Kinzer
was brought to this trial by the plaintiffs. His identity
as a witne.ss was never disclosed in answer to written
interrogatories submitted prior to trial (R. 36, 37, 40).
Undoubtedly Mr. Kinzer was interrogated by the plaintiffs' attorneys, and as a result of these interrogations,
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the plaintiff's attorney, Mr. c·onder, made the statement
before Mr. Kinzer took the st~and, to the effect as above
related "He was paid a check by a Chinaman, Your
Honor. lie doesn't know whether it was lYir. Hong or
not." (R. 91) It should be observed that righi after that
Mr. Kinzer volunteered the information, after having
observed the actions of the court, the antics of his employer Watson, and the testimony preceeding the statement by Mr. Conder, "Yes it was."
Mr. Wayne R. Kinzer was then called as a witness
on behalf of the plaintiff. He stated that he did brick
work on the building and testified that he was paid for
that work by 1.oitness Watson, his employer, but thereafter there was so1ne added zrork that he hadn't been
paid for (R. 91). L~ pon such a statement made and admitted by the witness, it can hardly be argued that this witness was unbiased or prejudiced in this action. Then he
was asked "Did you ever receive any check from :llr.
Hong?" (R. 91) To this he ans\Yered ·'Yes.'~ That he
had received a check fron1 ~Ir. Hong so1ne time in Septeinber, and that the san1e \Yas for een1ent work on the
extension on the Golden Pheasant restaurant.
·upon cross exa1nination, 1\Ir. Kinzer testified
that the check "Tas in the an1ount of $71.00 (R. 92).
After the testin1onY of !Ir. l{inzer the court then
.asked "JJir. Ashworth., do you desire to put nzore
test1>n1ony on P'' (R. 93) It might be "Torthy to note
that up to this point :Thfr. Ashworth had not had the
opportunity· to put an~r testin1on~r on 'Yhatsoever as all
witnesses had been called by the plaintiff or the court.
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Appellant Hong was then called as a witness on
his own behalf and he testified. He denied that he had
any conversation whatsoever with Mr. Watson concerning having a partnership with Mr. McDermond, he had
never stopped to talk to him except one time when he
asked who was going to pay, to which he replied "I
don't know," and that he told him that he had nothing
to do with it because the building and material was
ordered by McDermond. On cross examination he testified that he didn't know who !1r. Buehner was. It should
be recalled at this point that even Mr. Buehner had
some question in his mind to the effect that I-Iarry Hong
only started to recognize him towards the end of his
numerous visits to the cafe. The court asked of Mr.
Hong, on its o\\rn behalf, whether or not he had ever
given the young man Kinzer any money or a check.
Appellant Hong replied "No.'' He was questioned "for
cement work" and he replied "No." (R. 93, 94).
Upon this testimony in review of the ease, the court
made it.s omnibus findings of fact No. 5 (R. 98). Fro1n
this finding of fact, .and this fact alone, the court can1e
to the conclusion, that judgment should be entered in
favor of the plaintiffs and against appellant, without one
shred of trial evidence concerning at whose ins.tance the
South State Builders Supply material was furnished.
Upon the foregoing finding and a conclusion that
plaintiff's lien should be foreclosed against appellant
(R. 99), the court entered judgment in favor of the
plaintiffs and against the defendant Harry Hong, in
the sum of $771.94 in favor of plaintiff Buehner Block
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Co., and the sum of $436.56 in favor of South State
Builders Supply; foreclo.sing all of the defendant's
right, title and interest in and to the described property,
in which defendant had a leasehold interest.
Appellant filed a motion for a new trial and to
amend the findings conclusions, and judgment, upon the
ground set forth at R. 106, 107 and supported by affidavits which stand uncontradicted in the record (R. 102
to 105). The court did amend the findings of fact and
conclusions of law so as to amend Paragraph 5 to show
defendant Hong as a partner instead of a partner and
agent, but denied defendant's motion for a new trial
(R. 108).
This appeal is prosecuted from the findings of fact,
conclusions of law, judgment so entered, and the whole
thereof.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
THE COMPLAINT OF THE PLAINTIFFS FAIL TO
STATE A CLAIM UPON WHICH RELIEF MAY BE
GRAN·TED THE PLAINTIFFS. SO FAR AS DEFENDANT
AND APPELLANT HARRY HONG IS CONCERNED.

Concerning plaintiffs first cause of action, the foreclosure of a lien action, no Notice of Lien ''hatsoever being recorded or lien alleged against the leasehold interest
of appellant Hong, it is impossible to foreclose a lien
not in existence. Plaintiffs complaint does not state a
claim or facts sufficient to 1nake appellant Hong personally liable to plaintiffs in a foreclosure of said lien
action brought against owner Glezos.
Concerning plaintiffs second rause of ac.tion, the
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unjust enrichment action, the fact that Appellant Hong
claimed a leasehold interest in the real property, the
fact that the plaintiffs on their own for the benefit of
all the named defendants or each of them furnished
materials with the knowledge, consent or approval of
all the named defendants or e~ach of them, certainly does
not state a claim or facts sufficient upon which .appellant
Hong would be personally liable. Every .stockholder in
the clubs or any workman on the job could be found to
have some interest in the property, would have benefitted by the plaintiffs furnishing materials on their
own or in reliance upon the orders placed by promoter
McDermond and Copa Sup·pe.r Club Van N oy; could have
had knowledge, consented and approved of the material
being furnished and they could hardly in the absence
of an allegation of contractual relationship or estoppel
be liable for payment of such materials furnished.
Owner Glezo·s certainly claimed an interest in the real
property, he benefitted by some, if not all of the materials furnished, he knew definitely of the materials
being furnished because he was contacted immediately after the first material was furnished and he
certainly approved of the material being furnished inasmuch as he gave permission for the building to be
added to. Admitting all of these allegations. to be true
in one degree or another as they are in the case at bar,
said complaint still does not and did not in the absence
of further allegations of a contractual liability or estoppel state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
The trial court found in effect this to be true in dis-
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miSSing plaintiffs action against owner Glezos and so
should have granted appellant Hong's motion to dismiss
plaintiffs action because the complaint likewise failed
to state a claim .against Appellant Hong (R. 6).
Further, to recover in an action of Quasi Contract
or c·ontract Implied in Law a benefit must be conferred
or received either (1) through mistake; (2) in the performance of a contract; (3) through the commission of
a tort; or (4) through duress. If a benefit is conferred
under any other situation it is usually said to be conferred voluntarily and no quasi contractual obligation
arises. The complaints of the plaintiffs are silent as to
how the benefit was conferre·d upon, or received by
appellant Hong; Beyond the fact that plaintiff Buehner
Block Co. agreed to furnish materials to C. C.
McDermond who was a building contractor, under a sales
contract made between the said C. C. ~IeDermond and
the plaintiff Buehner Block Co. by the terms of
which plaintiff Buehner Block Co. agreed to furnish
materials as required and the said C. C. ~IeDermond
agreed to pay the plaintiff Buehner Block Co. therefor in full on or before the tenth of the month
following the 1nonth of purchase (Exhibits 1 and 2).
That plaintiff South State Builders Supply furnished
1naterials to Spencer \ 7an Noy, 'Yho ""'"as the general
contractor, under a contract 1uade bet""'"een Nick and
J(atina Glezos and Spenrer \;an Noy~ by the ter1n.s of
which plaintiff South State Builders Supply did agree
to furnish and deliver n1aterials .and said Spencer r'an
Nay and Nick and I~atina (i-lezos d.£d agree to pay the
plaintiff South State Builders Supply therefor the suin

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

35
of $394.84 (Exhibits 3 and 4).
There is no alleg.ation whatsoever that Harry I-Iong.
was a partner of any of the defendants or individuals
named in the complaint or in s:aid contracts referred to
in Exhibits 2 and 4. There being an exzJress contract
in being between plaintiffs .and said named individuals
under which the materials were furnished and no partnership allegation that appellant Hong was a partner of
any or all of the individuals and liable therefor, an
implied or Quasi Contract action cannot exist. The law
on this matter is set forth in 12 Am. Jur. 505, Sec. 7.
The text writer there .states :
"There cannot be an express and an implied
contract for the same thing existing at the same
time. It is only when parties do not expressly
agree that the law interposes and raises a promise. No agreement can be implied where there
is an express one existing."
Citing cases, footnotes 19 and 20, Footnote 20 cites the
Utah case of Verdi vs. Helper State Bank, 57 Ut. 502,
196 P 225, 15 ALR 641, in which the court stated :
"A contract may not be implied where an
express contract exists.'' Also, "In a law case the
verdict cannot be sustained on .appeal if the evidence does not support the allegations of the complaint, even though the evidence might have supported findings in plaintiffs favor, if the allegations of the complaint had been different, and
were subject to amendment after introduction
of evidence, since the Supreme Court has not
original jurisdiction in such c.ases, and cannot
enter judgment merely because it thinks one or
the other of the parties is entitled to prevail."
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The plaintiffs having an express contract in existence
by their own admis.sion concerning the furnishing of
said materials with named individuals, plaintiffs second
cause of action fails to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted so far as defendant and appellant Harry
Hong is concerned.
Partnership liability was never raised by the pleadings prior to trial. The most that could be said from the
pleadings was that appellant Hong was a co-tenant with
the other tenants. This court in the case of Rocky Mountain Stud Farm Co. vs. Lunt et al, 40 Ut. 299, 151 P
521, in distinguishing and holding that co-tenants were
not partners stated :
"The partners have a joint interest in the
a~sets of the partnership, and are required to sue
and be sued jointly in reference thereto."
This privilege was not afforded the appellant. In the
case of Prows vs. Hawley et al, 72 Dt. 444, 271 P 31,
citing numerous Utah cases, it is stated:
"Until the court has found on all the material
issued raised by the pleadings, findings are insufficient to support judgment."
It is the contention of appellant in tlz is case that i.t i.s
Just as tt"tte that in the case U)het"e findi11gs of fact, conclusions of law, and judgn1.ent are rendered and all at·e
dependent upon such a vital an-d rnaterial issue as partnership liability, the absence of which is not 1·aised by
the pleadings and is omitted and not alleged in the
complaint, it is self evident that the contplai1~t is not
sufficient and is fatally defective and fails to state a
claim upon u;hich relief can be granted.
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POINT II
THE FINDINGS OF F AGT AND CONCLUSIONS OF
LAW ARE INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE JUDGMENTS
IN FAVOR OF PLAINTIFFS.

The court concluded that plaintiffs were entitled to
judgment ag.ainst appellant Harry Hong and in favor
of plaintiffs (R. 99). It further concluded that plaintiffs were not entitled to foreclose their lien.s against
defendant and owner Glezos but these s.ame liens could be
foreclosed against ~'appellant Harry Hong's leas.ehold
interest, and the sheriff should sell the same as on execution and apply the proceeds derived therefrom upon the
money judgment (R. 101). This the court did without
a lien or Notice of Lien recorded ag.ainst a partnership,
the appellant Hong or against his leas.ehold interest.
It is an elementary fact that there must be a lien to foreclose before a foreclosure can be ordered and Chapter 38,
Section 1, Paragraph 7 of the Utah Code 1953 provides
that the same must be filed and recorded. The trial court
found only the following material findings of fact.
2-3. Plaintiff Buehner Block Co. furnished
building materials in the reasonable sum of $695.51 and
plaintiff South State Builders Supply Co. furnished
building material in the reasonable sum of $394.87 for
improving property owned by Glezos.
4. That appellant Hong had a leasehold on said
property.
5. That said materials were furnished at the instance of the defendant Charles C. McDermond, who
was then and there acting as a partner of the defendant,
Harry Hong.
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That plaintiff Buehner Block Co. and South
State Builders Supply C-o. recorded a lien against said
real property.
The above findings certainly do not find that there
was a lien or Notice of Lien recorded against appellant
Hong or upon his leasehold interest which could be foreclosed against by the plaintiffs.
Said findings do not find that appellant and defendant Hong or Charles C. McDermond, acting a.s his
partner, were unjustly enriched or what benefit was
conferred upon either individually or the found but
unalleged partnership.
There is no finding as to what kind, type or scope
of business the found but unalleged partnership was
in when promoter McDermond was acting as a partner
of defendant, Harry Hong, nor that the liability was
the result of acts done within the scope of partnership
busines.s. "A partnership alu·ays ex·ists as a 'result of a
voluntary contract between the persons held to be partners and n,ever exists solely by operatio,n of la·w. Partnership by estoppel or holding out is only an apparent
and not real exception to this rule." (22 A1n. & Eng.
Ency. Law p. 1-t) Certainly there "~as no partnership
contract alleged or found bet"~een defendant Hong and
other defendants in this case, nor ""as there .a finding
estopping the appellant Harry Hong fron1 denying that
a partnership did exist.
6-7.

There is no finding .as to 'vhat relationship, if any,
Appellant Hong had individually or as a found partner
to the other defendants "Copa Supper Club," ''\Talley
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Amusement Enterprises, Inc." and Charles C. McDermond individually, and against whom default judgments
were entered for these same materials, nor with Copa
Supper Club Van N oy who was the only person who
ordered, purchased and paid upon the material furnished
by plaintiff South State Builders Supply Co.
This court in llfitchell v. Jensen, et al., 29 Ut. 346,
81 Pac. 165, headnotes 4 and 8, stated:
"Where certain of the defendants were unknown to the transaction, except as they may have
been members of the alleged partnership, or were
obligors arising from their connection with an
abortive corporation, the failure of the court to
find what connection or relation such defendants
had with the corporation, or what they had to do
therewith, or what they had to do with the bus,iness and dealings carried on in its name, was
fatal to the right of plaintiff to a judgment against
such defendants as partners."
"It is the duty of the trial court to find on
all the material issue·s made by the pleadings,
whether evidence be introduced or not, and, if
there be no finding on a material issue the judgment cannot be supported."
The fact that the complaint or pleadings fail to allege
a partnership between defendant and appellant Hong
and others is hardly an excuse for not finding what connection or relation defendant Hong and defendant McDermond had toward the partnership, with its undisclosed business, its undisclosed name, or the other defendants named in plaintiff's comp}aints.
There is no finding whatsoever that the materials
furnished at the instance of the defendant Charles C.
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McDermond were purchased within the scope of the
found but unalleged partnership business. There isn't
even a finding that the materials furnished were delivered to, purchased by, or sold to Harry Hong individually or within the scope of the partnership business.
The court in Prows vs. Hawley, et al, 72 Ut. 444, 271
P 31, in an action for the price of oats delivered to one
member of partnership at page 456 of 72 TJtah states:
"True, a memb-er of a partnership may, because of his membership be held individually
liable for a partnership debt or obligation incurred within the scope of the partnership busines.s. But, as seen, no partnership or partnership
liability or obligation is alleged and none found.
And on the complaint no judgment could have
been taken against the partnership. The only liability alleged and found against the defendants
was a personal and individual liability incurred
at their 'special instance and request'."
The rule of law and the courts finding in the above
case is set out in headnote 9 of 72 l"T"t. 446, which is as
follows:
"In an action for the price of oats delivered
to one member of a partnership, omnibus finding
that oats were purchased by and delivered to
defendants at their •special instance and requesf
would not suffice as finding that oats were purchased within the scope of partnership business;
word 'special' denoting particular kind or character distinct from other kinds an exceptional
cha~acte;; word 'instance' denoting an impelling
motive, Influence, or cause, at the solicitation or
suggestion of; word 'request' denoting an expression or desire to some one for something, to ask~
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and the phrase 'at his ~pecial instance and request' denotes something which in its nature and
in a degree is personal, something solicited, suggested, or requested by one personally, or some
one for or on his behalf."
As in this cited Prows vs. Hawley case, this is an
action for the price of materials not so much as even
delivered as in the cited c.as.e but only furnished to one
member of an unalleged but found partnership, and the
omnibus finding No. 5 in thi.s case is not by any means
as far reaching as in the cited case in which the finding
was that "oats were purchased by and delivered to defendants" but only here that "materials were furnished"
and not as in the cited case at their "special instance and
request" but only at the "instance of the defendant,
Charles C. McDermond."
The cited omnibus finding was not such as would
suffice as finding that oats were purchased within the
scope of p artnership business. The omnibus No. 5 finding in this case finding only that materials were "furnished" (not purchased and delivered) at the instance
of the defendant Charles C. ltl cDermond, (not at their
special instance and request) can hardly be such a finding as to suffice a finding that materials were purchased
within the scope of partnership business; word "furnishing" denoting to supply, provide, provide for use,
deliver whether gratuitously or otherwise; word "ilnstance'' denoting a~ in the above cited case an impelling
motive, influence, or cause, at the solicitation or suggestion of; and the phrase "at the instance of the defendant
Charles C. McDermond" certainly denotes more than in
1
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the cited case something which in its nature and in a
degree is personal, something solicited, suggested or
requested by one personally, or by someone for or on
his behalf; it spells out more than a mere degree, it
does denote personal, solicited, suggested or requested
by one - that one being Charles C. McDermond.
P'OINT III
·T'HE OMNIBUS FINDING NO. 5 OF THE TRIAL COURT
IS NOT SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE, AND
IS CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE AND THE OVERWHELMING WEIGHT THEREOF.

The trial court by finding materials were furnished
at the instance of the defendant, promoter McDermond,
who was then and there acting as the partner of appel..
lant Hong, in effect found appellant Hong promising
to pay the debts of another, without plaintiffs pleading
or alleging the same so as to afford appellant Hong
the opportunity to den·y, answer or plead the statute
of frauds "\vhich provides that a promise to pay the
debt of another must be in "\vriting signed by the party
to be charged.
Appellant is fully a"\vare of the rule that this court
will not weigh evidence and "\viii sustain a judgment in
a law action if the srune is supported by competent,
substantial evidence. But this court. in Contin.e'ntal Ba'nk
and Trust Co. vs. Steu·art, 4 Ut. 2nd 228, 291 P 2nd 890,
citing Seybold vs. Union Pacift~c Railroad Co., 239 P
2nd 174, said:
·'Though positive testin1ony of "\Yitness believed by trial court is ordinarily regarded as suf-
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ficient to compel affirmance of trial courts finding, it is not necessarily so under .all circumstance." "Though certain testimony standing
alone may be sufficient to support finding, it must
always be appraised in light of attendant circumstances and countervailing testimony and if, when
so viewed, it appe.ars so clearly and palpably unreasonable that no fact trier acting fairly and
reasonably could accept it, then it must be rejected as matter of law, and fact determined
otherwise."
Concerning that portion of omnibus finding No. 5
which finds s.aid materials were furnished at the instance
of defendant, Charles C. McDermond, there is not one
scintilla of evidence that the materials furnished by South
State Builders Supply Co. ·were sold, delivered or
even so mttch as furnished to Charles C. McDermond.
The only evidence on this is contradicted by plaintiffs
own writing and admissions (R. 36, Notice of Lien, Exhibit 4, delivery and order slips, Exhibit 3), whi'ch recite
even under o.ath that said materials were furnished to
Copa Supper Club Van N oy for and on behalf of Copa
Supper Club and owner Glezos.
There is not a scintilla of evidence that the materials
furn,ished by plaint-iff Buehner Block Co. U'ere sold
to the found but unalleged partnership of McDermond,
Hong, and others, and within the unalleged and unfound
scope of said found but unalleged partnership. It is the
uncontradicted evidence that the said materials were sold
to McDermond personally or as a representative of the
Valley Amusement Enterprises Inc., or/and the Copa
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Supper Club, and not dealing with a partnership, as is
.stated by counsel for plaintiff, "McDern1ond is the one
who ordered the material, I must admit that so far as
the direct contract is concer11ted we have no direct contract with 1\fr. Hong nor 1\tfr. Glezos" (R. 47). Substantiated by the testimony of plaintiffs witness, Donald
Buehner, "I approached him (Hong) and told him who I
represented and that we were wondering who was going
to pay." (R. 84)
"I approached him (Hong), I don't know exactly
how many times, four or five times in that front part of
his restaurant. Q. "And were all the conversations relative to the collection of this account!" A. "Yes. I tried
to get an answer from him. He kind of would not commit
himself. I used the logic that there was a possibility of
his being liable for it and if he knew that because he had
a lease trying to get an answer from him and he recognized me and knew I was from Buehner Block toward the
end of our t·isits." Q. "Didn't Mr. 1\tlcDermond order the
block from you or your company f' .A. •'Y es. Well someone called and ordered for the Golden Pheasant. We
investigated because !Irs. Glezos didn't know anything
about it. We looked up the O""'ller of the Golden Pheasant
and so we went over there and lJfr. J.llcDerrnotul ·zcas there
and said that it was he that ordered in this Golden
Pheasant name and we changed it." Q...In other words,
your contract was with 1\fcDermond, is that correctf"
A. "Yes. Of cour.se it was after the blocks "~ere delivered
that we found this out." Q. "And ,rere you intending to
look for payment from J.l! cDermond, is that true'!" A.
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"No. When we learned that out (note first order and
delivery slip made out and dated 7/14/54 charged to C. C.
McDermond cjo Golden Pheasant and all others subsequent beginning with the following day 7/15/54 made out
to C. C. McDermond cjo Copa Supper Club. Between
R. 39 and 40, also Exhibit 1), we had had experience with
Mt·. McDern~ond before and for that reason we were
looking for liability." Appellant cannot resist the observation that if there is a basis for finding estoppel in this
case that the same could certainly be invoked against
plaintiff Buehner. Q. "So it was too late, Mr. MeDermond had the blocks, and it was too late~" A. "Not
exactly." (R. 85) Again plaintiff admits that it was not
too late to have protected himself if he thought it was
to his .advantage to still be looking for liability prior to
the time the material furnished was u.sed. If it was to his
advantage to have talked with Hong before the block was
up he did that, if it was to his advantage not to have done
so then he didn't talk to appellant. The fact is that after
he was appraised in his first conversation with owner
Glezos he furnished material by his own te,stimony in
reliance upon promoter lVIcDermond alone and the representations made on behalf of defendants Valley Amusement Enterprises, Inc. and Copa Supper Club. l-Ie did so
with his eyes open knowing full well with whom he was
dealing and it was not with a partnership.
Assuming that s.aid materials were "purchased"
instead of merely being "furnished," there isn't a scintilla of evidence that the same were purchased by a partnership or within the scope of the business of a partner-
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ship. Plaintiff South State Builders Sup·ply sole and only

evidence is that said materials were purchased from them
and paid thereon solely by Supper Club Van N oy and
the Copa Supper Club (R. 36, Exhibits 3 and 4) ; at the
instance of Nick Glezos (allegation 5 of plaintiffs complaint, R. 18). Plaintiff Buehner Block Co.'s evidence
was that said materials were purchased by promoter McDermond for and on behalf of owner Glezos
(Exhibit 2), were furnished at the instance of Nick Glezos
(allegation 5 of plaintiffs complaint, R. 1), were purchased by McDermond individually, by the Valley Amusement Enterprises, and the Copa Supper Club (default
papers R. 13 and 14).
Assuming that said materials were "ordered" instead of merely being "furnished at the instance" there
isn't a scintilla of evidence that the sa1ne we're ordered
by a partnership or within the scope of the bus·iness of a
partnership. Plaintiff South State Builders Supply sole

evidence and only evidence is that san1e ''ere ordered by
Supper Club \'"an Noy (R. 36, Exhibits 3 and 4); at the
instance of Nick Glezos (allegation 5 of plaintiffs complaint, R. 18). Plaintiff Buehner Block Co.'s evidence
was that said 1naterials \vere purchased by proInoter l\IcDermond for and on behalf of owner Glezos
(Exhibit 2); at the instance of Nick Glezos (allegation
5 of plaintiffs con1plaint, R. 1 and 2): by ~fcDermond
individually; by the \Talley Amuse1nent Enterprises; and
the Copa Supper Club (default papers R. 13 .and 14).
The only adverse testin1ony at the trial "~as the testimony
of plaintiffs \vitness Don Buehner \Yho testified: That
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they investigated on the first order because Mrs. Glezos
knew nothing about it. That they went over there. That
McDennond was there and said to them that it was he
that ordered in this "Golden Pheasant" name and so
they changed the order. That their contract was with
McDennond. That they weren't looking for payment
from McDermond because they had learned by previous
experience not to and for this reason were looking for
liability. That McDermond at this time didn't exactly
have the block (R. 85) but they were looking for someone to pay for the blocks 'vith McDermond. That Harry
Hong never signed an invoice or delivery slip and that
they never sent him a staten1ent and that they only talked
to him about the amount. That Harry Hong never did
agree to pay for the block.
That the first conversation with Hong was, he believed, during the laying up of the block. That when they
first investigated, they·~ telephoned J\tfr. Glezos and went
over to the job and that he didn't think the bricks were
laid up (R. 86). At no time whatsoever did plaintiff
rely 'Upon or believe that they were dealing with a partnership. If the block was up when they first jnvestigated
then they never relied upon a partnership. If it was
partly up and as witnes.s says not too late (R. 85) to do
something about the block delivered, it is certainly unjust
to impose liability upon an unalleged, unproven but found
partnership when plaintiffs had in their hands the privilege and opportunity to have protected themselves or to
reduce the loss they have incurred by acting timely. If
the block wa.s not even laid up and -more materials were
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furnished to McDermond after they had investigated and
under the eontract they had with McDermond (R. 85 and
86) it would be grossly unjust to impose an implied contract by law upon appellant Hong for nothing he had
done, by finding that he and McDermond were in a partnership and the partnership was the one that ordered, or
at the instance of the partnership such materials were
furnished.
·.
From this the question arises what kind of a partnership was it? Was it a construction partnership?
There is no evidence as to what business or trade the
unalleged but found partnership was in, what the scope
of its business was, who its members were, what agreement created the partnership, when it was created, what
the members community interest was, los.s and profits.
The case of Rocky Mountain -Stud Farnt Co. v. Lunt, et
al., 46 Ut. 299, 151 P. 521, is herewith cited in support
of what makes for finding of a partnership.
Owner Glezos denied appellant Hong was in partnership with McDer1nond (R. 70, 71, 72). Appellant Hong
denied that he was ever in a partnership with McDerInond, that he wasn't even a member of the Copa Supper
Club or the \Talley Alnusement Enterprises or held stock
in any of the same (R. 55). That he collected an exact
rental of $250.00 a 1nonth from !IcDermond or others
who occupied the pre1nises 'vhen he sublet to them. That
this was the an1ount that he was paying to owner Glezos.
~rhis uncontradicted evidence could hardly· be interpreted
as a partner sharing in profits and loss, profitting thereby. in an exact amount a.s this each month. The 22nd
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Article of the Articles of Incorporation sets forth the
best evidence, and supports the testimony of appellant
Hong that he was to sell his leasehold to McDermond
who in turn would utilize it for the use and benefit of the
Copa Supper Club.
The only testimony in support of a partnership is the
oral, biased and prejudiced testimony of witness Watson,
who by his own admission "wouldn't know whether it was
a corporation or a company, just partners." (R. 83) He
testified that he had about half a dozen conversations
with Harry Hong and that no one was present at any of
these conversations (R. 80).
That McDermond told him they were going to have
a night club and that he had built at least ten different
night clubs, similar to this one, throughout the Rocky
Mountain Area here and that the six of them were extend. ing that building back there with the consent of Harry
Hong, who was also one of the six. That it was, to .his
, knowledge, all supposed to be under the one corporation
of these six different people which Harry Hong was one
, of them. He was thereafter asked what was said about a
. corporation. To this he answered "They said it would
: be a company. I wouldn't know whether you u,ould say
. it was a corporation or a company. It's just partners.
McDermond told me there was six partners there and
Harry Hong was one of them." (R. 83, 84).
Concerning the requisite.s of a partnership, this court
, in Bentley v. Brossard, et al., 33 Utah 396, 94 P. 736, said:
"The requisites of a partnership are that the
parties must have joined together to carry on a
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trade or adventure for their common benefit, each
contributing p~operty o.r services, .an?, ~;av~g a
community of Interest m the profit~. . While a
community of i;nterest i~ the p-rof~ts ~s not .of
itself conclusive of the ex~stence of a partnersh~p,
it is of the very essence of the contracts, and a
partnership cannot exist without it."
In the Cavanaugh v. Salisbury case, 22 Ut. 465, 63
P. 39, it was said:
"A partner without special authority can bind
the firm only within the scope of the busines.s, and
the firm, in. the absence of rat-ification,_ is not
bound by any transaction of a partner outside the
real or apparent scope."
In Peterson v. Armstrong, 24 Ut. 96, 66 P. 767 it was
said:
"A partner, without special autho1·ity, has no
power to bind the cotnpany in any t1·ansaction outside the apparent scope of the partnership busir
ness, and persons dealing 1.cith the parl'l'ltership
are bound to take notice thereof."
Witness further testified he "~as giYen the stall by McDerinond for p.aYJ.nent of the block \York he did for McDermond, and that one fello"~ that \YOrked for him still
had $150.00 eon1ing fron1 the job for which he blamed
appellant Hong because he and another Chinaman partner were to pay the labor costs (R. 81 and 89). Admits
that promoter ~fcDer1nond paid labor costs and in the
same breath says appellant Hong "~as supposed to.
Appellant submits that "~itness Watson ~s testimony
when considered with his voluntary actions in open court,
allowed and encouraged by the trial court conduct, that
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his testimony does not constitute substantial evidence
because Watson was an interested and biased witness,
he had an axe to grind because he had to wait for his
money and one n1an that worked for hin1 still had $150.00
coming because two Chinamen didn't pay the labor bills
(R. 81 and 89). It just doe.sn't make sense that appellant
would contribute $36,000.00 worth of lease and equipment
together with paying all labor costs on the building to be
a member of a partnership of six. His testimony is all
oral; his testimony is contradicted by owner Glezos, .a
disinterested witness, and Hong, an interested witness;
he doesn't know whether there was a partnership, corporation or company. His testimony should, therefore, be
considered in the light of his interest.
This court, in the recent case of Continental Bank
and Tr~tst Co. v. Stewart, 4 Ut. 2nd 228, 291 P. 2nd 890,
citing Seybold v. Union Pacific Railroad Company, 239
P. 2nd 174, said:
"Rule that, in determining whether certain
testimony is sufficient to support finding, it must
be appraised in light of all attendant circumstances and countervailing testimony was p.articularly applicable where testimony in question was
that or witness who had vital personal interest in
the controver.sy."

Further, it is stated at 32 C.J.S. 1065, Sec. 1026:
"The bias of a witness has a well known and
pernicious influence in quickening or deadening
his memory. This is especially true when he testified to conversations with or oral statements made
'" " " "'~'.·
by others.''
--:' This is well illu.strated in the case at bar by his answers
..·.1:1111111111,
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at R. 82 and 83, where on being pressed for a direct answer on where and when he was told by appellant that he
was a partner with six others he gave the following
answers:
Q. "Where were you at when ~fr. Hong told you
that, Mr. Watson~" A. "Oh! On the southwest corner
of the building, outside." Q. "What time of day was it~"
A. "I would venture it was around sometime in the morning, between 9 :00 and 12 :00 o'clock.'' Q. "Can you make
that more definite
A. ''No, I cannot." Q. "It could
have been any place between 9 :00 and 12 :00 o'clock, is
that right~" A. "Yes. It has been two years ago."
The foregoing testimony comes under the class of
evidence referred to in Footnote No. 53 to Sec. 1031, of 32
CJS 1071:
"Evidence of the 'I don't remember' class is
of doubtful probative force."
0
/''

Lastly, the're ·isn't a scintiUa of evidence that the
unalleged but found partne'rship 1cas unjustly enriched
by the materials furnished to lJlcDer'lnond and Copa
Supper Club Va1-t N oy. The building, the fixtures and the

leasehold was never owned by a partnership nor was
promoter l\!cDern1ond acting as agent for appellant
Hong, and the plaintiffs never furnished materials to a
partnership, never relied upon or acted upon the instance
of a partnership to their detrin1ent and to a partnership's
enrichment unjustly obtained. Even if it could be said
that plaintiffs dealt with a partnership there is no evidence that Copa Supper Club 'Tan Noy "'"as a member of
the partnership and was acting 'vi thin the scope of part-
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nership authority so a.s to qualify as a partner with authority referred to in the case of Peterson v. Armstrong,
24 Ut. 96, 66 P 767, in which the court said:
"A partner, without special authority, has no
power to bind the con1pany in any transaction outside the apparent scope of the partnership business, and persons dealing with the paTtnership
are bound to take notice thereof."
See also Cavanaugh v. Salisbury, 63 P. 39, 22 Ut. 465; also
Buthiel v. Gilmer, et al., 23 Ut. 84, 62 P. 817, in which the
rule was laid down that he who seeks to hold the firm
liable by virtue of a transaction not U'ithin the real or
apparent scope of the business of the partnership, he
deals so at his peril and the burden is up-on him to show
that the contracting partner had authority to enter into
the transaction.
POINT IV
·THE EVIDENCE AND FINDINGS OF FACT ARE INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE CONCLUSION OF LAW
ENTITLING ·THE PLAINTIFF TO FORECLOSE PLAINTIFFS' LIENS AGAINST THE DEFENDANT, HARRY HONG.

There isn't a scintilla of evidence th.at plaintiffs had a
lien against the right, title and lea.sehold interest of appellant Hong relative to described property. There being
no Notice of Lien timely recorded, a conclusion of law
finding that a lien recorded against someone else, which
has failed, and that the same lien should be foreclosed
ag.ainst another person not even named in the Notice of
Liens recorded, just doesn't make good logical sense let
alone good judicial sense.
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POINT V
THE TRIAL COURTS ACTIONS OF ELICITING TESTIMONY BY RECALLING AND QUESTIONING ADVERSE
WITNESS TO DEFENDANT, AFTER PLAINTIFFS HAD
RES'TED, ALLOWING SAID SAME ADVERSE WITNESS
TO FREELY INTERFERE WITH GENERAL ·CONDUCT OF
CASE BY ATTORNEYS WAS PREJUDI·CIAL AND ERROR.

A trial judge's duties are of a judicial nature, he
should not act as counsel for a party especially after
said party has rested, by recalling said resting party's
witnesse.s on his own behalf. The Court: ''Mr. Watson,
do you want to say something 1" l\Ir. \V. atson: "Yes."
The Court: "Just come in here." (R. 88). The Court:
"Just a minute, Mr. Watson. We will call on yon." (R.
90) The Court: "·Come in, Mr. \\. . atson, if you want to
testify further." (R. 90) The Court: (To witness Watson) "If he can testify you had better bring him in. We
can't have you testifying for him." The Court: "Is he
here~'' The Court : "Let n1e see the man.~~ (R. 91) He
should not allow adverse "itnesses to interrupt c.ounsel
in the ordinary conduct of a rase: (R. SS, 90) nor should
he disregard completely and not pass upon objections
timely made by counsel.against an adverse "~itness (twice
R. 89); and it is subn1itted he should not make up his
mind prior to hearing defense counsel present his case as
could be reasoned fron1 the courts question put to Mr.
Ashworth: "Do you desire to put 111ore testimony on,
Mr. Ashworth'" (R. 93), and to !Ir. Conder: "Well,
there is no use arguing about it. It is Yours
if you
.
. want
.it." (R. 87)
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In 53 Am. Jur. 75, Sec. 75, it is s.aid:
"He (the judge) should not usurp the functions of counsel by prescribing the order of calling witnesses or interrupting with the general
conduct of the case by the attorneys or by examining witnesses to the exclusion of counsel."
It is submitted th.at the trial court's conduct of the
trial after plaintiff had rested (R. 86) by recognizing,
encouraging and eliciting testimony from witness Watson
who was not on the stand or even recalled by coun.sel of
either plaintiffs or defendant, and who could hardly be
deemed an uninterested witness in view of his antics from
the audience at the backs of counsel when recognized, by
the court, is error. This same witness Watson being
biased for having testified more than once that he had
to wait for his money, (R. 81, 88, 89) and twice (once
from the audience) that a man who worked for him still
had $150.00 coming from the job which he blamed defendant Hong for (R. 81 and 89). Further that as a
direct result thereof, the witness Kinzer was produced
who claimed he had money yet coming from the job, and
thus a biased witness (R. 91) had a perfect clear memory
of having received a check in the sum of $71.00 from
appellant Hong, though previously had not apparently
relayed this information to plaintiffs attorneys. That
this testimony elicited directly as a result of the court's
apparent desire hy remarks made in open court in the
. . . . . presence of said witnesse·s, indicating a wanting to find
partnership liability upon appellant Hong, said remarks
being made while passing upon the motion to dismiss
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made by defendant and owner Glezos, such testimony
was certainly in the ei)TeS of this trial court of such material nature that appellant at the time suffered irrepar.
able damage. Counsel for appellant, fully cognizant of
their own short comings, do submit that the actions of
the trial court in conducting this case was such as would
unnerve the mo.st experienced of counsel and in view
of the courts actions in disregarding appellant's objections when made would make further objections useless
beyond possibly arousing the ire of the court.
POINT VI
THAT DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL
SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED.

In an effort to condense and be brief all other objections and errors complained of are included herein.
That the judgment was acquired by surprise which
ordinary prudence on the part of defendant Hong could
not have guarded against is an understatement and is
such surprise as is conten1plated by Rule 59 (a) and (e)
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure for which relief
should be granted. Nothing in the pleadings or Notice
of Liens filed indicated that if the recorded lien against
the owner in fee would fail in being foreclosed, it would ,
be or could be foreclosed against appellant's leasehold
interest. The same can be said about the finding and con·
elusion that the materials 'vere furnished to an unalleged
partnership of which .appellant was a member along with r
six ot~ers. No one could have, by any stretch of judicial
logic, anticipated frorn the pleadings prior to trial that
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plaintiffs "\vould be entitled to a judgment against defendant Charles C. McDermond individually, the Cop.a
Supper Club, ·valley Amusement Enterprises, Nick
Glezos individually, appellant individually and against
an unalleged partnership of six as a result of having
furnished material at the instance of Nick Glezos. Appellant in the case at bar was absolutely powerless to have
prep.ared a defense and guarded against the finding of
partnership liability being imposed upon hin1 from the
information relied upon in the pleadings. At the trial
the courts actions of acting as plaintiffs attorney by recognizing and recalling witness Watson upon its own volition, eliciting testimony after plaintiffs had rested and
before reopening the case at bar (R. 86 to 91), completely
disregarding objection_s made by appellant's counsel timely made (R. 89) was so surprising that even the most
experienced counsel would have been hard put to have
guarded against.
The presence of witness Kinzer at the trial after
plaintiffs had failed to name or disclose him as a witness
in answer to interrogatories submitted to them (R. 36,
37, and 40) and his subsequent testimony elicited by the
court when interferring with the gener.al conduct of the
case, that he had been paid by check in the amount of
$71.00 by appellant Hong was of such a surprising nature
that it even surprised counsel for the plaintiffs as 'veil,
as can easily be concluded from the following testimony
at R. 91:
The Court : "If he can testify you had better bring
him in. We can't have you testifying for him."
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!fr. Watson: "He got the check signed by Harry
Hong."
The Court : "Is he here~"
Mr. Draper: "Come forward."
The Court: "Let me see the man."
Mr. Conder: "He was paid a check by a Chinaman,
Your Honor. He doesn't know whether it was Mr. Hong
or not."
Mr. Kinzer: "Yes, it was."
Mr. Conder: "l\iay we reopen the case, your Honor!"
The Court: "You may."
He thereafter testified that "there was some added
work that I haven't been paid for yet." (R. 91)
That after said judgment, defendant Hong did discover that new evidence and material set out in his uncontradicted affidavit at R. 102 and 103 and such newly
discovered evidence and material "-hich could not with
reasonable diligence have been discovered before and
produced at trial and is such evidence and material as
contemplated by Rule 59 (a) (-!) of the [~talz Rules of
Civz~l Procedure.
That the trial court did by rendering judgment
against Appellant Hong indiYidually as a partner did
in effect find that appellant Hong did agree to pay the
debts of another, "\vithout haYing signed to do so in writing, to-wit: To pay for each and all the nruned defendants
in the case at bar except owner Glezos and to pay for an
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unknown, unnamed and unidentified p.artnership of six.
This finding although not spelled out directly is in violation of the Statutes of Fraud and as such is error in law.
The fact that the Statute of Frauds is an affirmative
defense should not bar it from being interposed .at this
time when there are no pleadings to which the defense
could be affirmatively alleged in answer thereto prior to
and be£ore trial.

CONCLUSION
]..,or each and all of the aforesaid reasons, appellant
submits that the judgment of the lower court should be
reversed, ordering judgment to be entered in favor of
appellant, Harry Hong and against plaintiffs, dismissing
plaintiffs cause of action or remanding the same back for
a new trial and appellant awarded his costs.
Respectfully submitted,

GEORGE H. SEARLE
.and
WAYNE A. ASH\VORTH,
Attorneys for Appellant
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